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We review research on reactions to mirrors and self-recognition in nonhuman 29 
primates, focusing on methodological issues. Starting with the initial demonstration in 30 
chimpanzees in 1970 and subsequent attempts to extend this to other species, self-31 
recognition in great apes is discussed with emphasis on spontaneous manifestations of 32 
mirror-guided self-exploration as well as spontaneous use of the mirror to investigate 33 
foreign marks on otherwise nonvisible body parts – the mark test. Attempts to show 34 
self-recognition in other primates are examined with particular reference to the lack of 35 
convincing examples of spontaneous mirror-guided self-exploration, and efforts to 36 
engineer positive mark test responses by modifying the test or using conditioning 37 
techniques. Despite intensive efforts to demonstrate self-recognition in other primates, 38 
we conclude that to date there is no compelling evidence that prosimians, monkeys, or 39 
lesser apes – gibbons and siamangs – are capable of mirror self-recognition.  40 
  41 
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Introduction 51 
The demonstration of visual self-recognition in chimpanzees (Gallup 1970) prompted 52 
sustained interest and controversy in the field of comparative psychology. The 53 
knowledge that humans’ nearest evolutionary relatives are sufficiently self-aware to 54 
be able to understand how they look from another visual perspective (i.e., their 55 
reflection in a mirror) helped pave the way for important empirical and theoretical 56 
developments, including experimental approaches for assessing theory of mind in 57 
great apes (Premack and Woodruff 1978). Like theory of mind, however, self-58 
recognition continues to be a contentious issue among anthropologists, biologists, 59 
philosophers and psychologists. Some authors resist the idea that the capacity for self-60 
recognition is not uniquely human, raising methodological issues (e.g., Heyes 1994).  61 
However, methodological refinements along with empirical and theoretical advances 62 
have led to repeated replication and confirmation of the capacity for self-recognition 63 
in great apes (Gallup et al. 1995; Povinelli et al. 1997). Gallup (1970) also reported 64 
that, unlike chimpanzees, macaque monkeys showed no evidence of self-recognition; 65 
he concluded that: “the capacity for self-recognition may not extend below man and 66 
the great apes” (p. 87). This proposal has stimulated many attempts to find self-67 
recognition in other species; indeed some authors have gone to extraordinary lengths 68 
in an effort to marshall support for continuity in cognitive capacities among species. 69 
The alternative view -- that fundamental qualitative differences in cognition might 70 
have evolved within the Primate order, including self-awareness, has been repeatedly 71 
challenged. Here, we review the history of research on responses to mirrors and self-72 
recognition in nonhuman primates, with special reference to recent claims for mirror 73 
self-recognition in non-great ape species. 74 
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Perhaps just as significant as the evidence for self-recognition in chimpanzees 75 
in Gallup’s (1970) original study was the absence of such evidence in macaque 76 
monkeys tested under identical conditions. When first confronted with their 77 
reflections, both chimpanzees and macaques reacted as if they were in the presence of 78 
an unfamiliar conspecific – a reaction that is typical of most visually capable 79 
organisms (Gallup 1968; Anderson 1994). But whereas chimpanzees soon started to 80 
use the reflection to carefully explore parts of their body that they could not normally 81 
see, such as looking inside their mouth, removing mucous from the corner of an eye, 82 
or investigating their ano-genital area (Fig. 1), similar spontaneous mirror-guided 83 
self-exploration was never observed in macaques; the latter continued to direct social 84 
responses towards the reflection, or simply ignored it as they habituated to the 85 
presence of the “other monkey.”   86 
After 10 days of mirror exposure, the chimpanzees and monkeys were 87 
anesthetized and marked on their forehead and an ear using a nonirritant, odorless dye. 88 
Upon recovery from anesthesia, in the absence of the mirror neither apes nor monkeys 89 
made any effort to touch the marks, which confirmed that they were unaware of their 90 
presence.  When the mirror was reinstated, however, chimpanzees but not macaques 91 
used the reflection to guide their fingers to the marks, which they then investigated. 92 
This behavioral difference confirmed that the apes, but not the monkeys, understood 93 
that the source of the individuals reflected in the mirror was themselves, corroborating 94 
self-recognition seen in the apes’ spontaneous mirror-guided self-exploration.  In 95 
addition, after touching the marks, the apes often examined and sniffed their fingers, 96 
in an apparent attempt to gain further information about the strange marks that could 97 
only be seen in the mirror.  98 
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Following Gallup’s (1970) report, two lines of primate research on the broad 99 
topic of “mirror-image stimulation and self-recognition” emerged. One aimed to 100 
extend knowledge about self-recognition in great apes - its ontogenetic and 101 
phylogenetic distributions, its relationship to other manifestations of self-awareness, 102 
and factors influencing its expression. The other approach was was characterized by 103 
many investigations of the responses of other primate species to mirrors, often 104 
including tests for self-recognition. Below we review both lines of research. 105 
 106 
Self-recognition in chimpanzees and orangutans  107 
To test the hypothesis that visual self-recognition would be shared with another 108 
species of primates, Lethmate and Dücker (1973) presented a mirror to two zoo-109 
housed orangutans as well as six chimpanzees, and found little difference in their self-110 
recognition: individuals of both species showed spontaneous mirror-guided self-111 
exploration of otherwise nonvisible body regions, and both used the mirror to 112 
investigate otherwise visually inaccessible marks on their bodies. In contrast, four 113 
gibbons from two species, two tufted capuchin and two spider monkeys, two lion-114 
tailed macaques, a Hamadryas baboon, and three mandrills all failed to show any 115 
signs of self-recognition; instead they showed only social responses to their reflection. 116 
Suarez and Gallup (1981) confirmed self-recognition in chimpanzees and an 117 
orangutan, and reported that one chimpanzee showed self-recognition after only four 118 
days of mirror exposure. This study also used an important control procedure 119 
originally introduced by Gallup, Wallnau and Suarez (1980) in a study of rhesus 120 
monkeys: in addition to a mark applied to a normally unseen body part such as the 121 
head, a similar mark was made on a directly visible area, such as the wrist. This 122 
procedure provided a logical means to discount a lack of curiosity and motivation to 123 
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touch unusual marks on their body as an explanation for the lack of any evidence for 124 
self-recognition in the third species of great ape tested by Suarez and Gallup: lowland 125 
gorillas (see below). 126 
 Several studies have investigated factors that might influence self-recognition 127 
in great apes. Early social experience appears to be one such factor. Whereas wild-128 
born, group-raised chimpanzees responded to their reflection in the same fashion as in 129 
Gallup’s (1970) study, laboratory-born chimpanzees raised in isolation from an early 130 
age failed to show any signs of self-recognition (Gallup et al. 1971). This work lent 131 
support to Mead’s (1934) view that the sense of self is shaped through social 132 
experiences and interactions. Concerning the onset of self-recognition in human 133 
infants, there is general agreement that the evidence becomes clear at around 16-24 134 
months of age (Amsterdam 1972; Anderson 1984; Nielsen and Dissanayake 2004). A 135 
sign-language-trained orangutan first showed convincing signs of mirror self-136 
recognition at the age of 3 years (Miles 1994), whereas non-sign-language trained 137 
chimpanzees did so at around 2.5 years of age (Lin et al. 1992). Bard et al. (2006) 138 
claim that chimpanzees may even show mirror-guided self-directed behaviors 139 
suggestive of self-recognition by 24 months of age; these studies suggest a slightly 140 
later ontogenetic emergence of self-recognition in great apes compared to typically 141 
developing human infants.  It should be noted, however, that the age 24 months 142 
applied only when the definition of self-recognition was relaxed to include “any 143 
mirror-guided self-touches.” (Bard et al. 2006, p. 201); mark-directed responses 144 
suggested a later emergence, at 28 months. But in the largest cross-sectional study to 145 
date – testing 92 captive chimpanzees - Povinelli et al. (1993) found that the capacity 146 
was far more developmentally delayed, with only one chimpanzee out of 46 who 147 
ranged from 2 to 6 years of age showing mirror self-recognition.  Signs of self-148 
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recognition, consisting of either spontaneous mirror-guided self-exploration or 149 
positive mark tests, were most commonly seen by Povinelli et al. (1993) among 150 
adolescents and young adults (8-15 years), with chimpanzees in middle to later 151 
adulthood showing fewer signs and less interest in their reflections. Until this 152 
apparent age-related decline in cognitive ability starts to impair the capacity for self-153 
recognition, however, it appears to be a stable, enduring trait, as shown by a study of 154 
two juvenile chimpanzees re-tested after a period of 1 year with no access to mirrors 155 
(Calhoun and Thompson, 1988), and a re-test of 12 chimpanzees 8 years after an 156 
initial assessment of their self-recognition ability (de Veer et al 2003). Using the same 157 
criteria to measure self-recognition, the latter study found that 67% of the 158 
chimpanzees showed the same reactions as when previously tested 8 years earlier. 159 
The ability of chimpanzees to recognize themselves under different conditions of 160 
mirror-image stimulation was reported by Kitchen et al. (1996). Six captive female 161 
chimpanzees aged 7 to 14 years were presented with regular, convex, concave and 162 
triptych (producing three images) mirrors. After confirming that all six apes passed 163 
the mark test, the authors observed mirror-guided self-referenced behaviors during the 164 
first exposure to all three kinds of distorting mirrors, which they concluded was 165 
evidence of “a level of abstractional ability” with regard to their self-awareness. 166 
It should be noted that, just as in humans, not all chimpanzees show evidence 167 
of self-recognition (Gallup 1997; Gallup et al 2011).  It is conceivable that intellectual 168 
and/or personality-related factors might influence the initial responses shown toward 169 
the reflection (e.g., aggression, submission, affiliation) in all species of great apes, 170 
and also contribute to individual differences in whether the transition from social to 171 
self-directed behavior eventually emerges. 172 
 173 
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Insert Fig. 1 about here 175 
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 177 
Self-recognition in bonobos 178 
Responses to mirror-image stimulation by bonobos – the great ape species most 179 
closely related to chimpanzees - were first described in 1994 (Hyatt and Hopkins 180 
1994; Westergaard and Hyatt 1994). The majority of the bonobos tested showed 181 
considerable interest in their reflection, and performed many more self-directed 182 
behaviors in mirror-present than mirror-absent sessions; their behaviors were largely 183 
indistinguishable from chimpanzees tested in similar conditions. In another study, 184 
several members of a group of zoo-housed bonobos engaged in spontaneous mirror-185 
guided self-directed behaviors such as picking their nose and eye region, i.e., using 186 
the reflection to investigate normally unseen body parts, and these behaviors were 187 
shown on the first exposure to the mirror (Walraven et al. 1995). Although no mark 188 
tests were conducted in these studies, it seems clear that like chimpanzees, bonobos 189 
readily used the mirror to examine and inspect otherwise unobservable body parts, 190 
and thus showed that they recognize themselves on the basis of “compelling instances” 191 
of self-exploration as set out by Povinelli et al. (1993, p. 351). 192 
 193 
The gorilla enigma  194 
Given their phylogenetic closeness to chimpanzees and humans, the absence of 195 
evidence for self-recognition in gorillas reported by Suarez and Gallup (1981) was 196 
unexpected. Like other great apes tested by Suarez and Gallup, the gorillas initially 197 
directed social responses to their reflection, a tendency that decreased across exposure 198 
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days. However, unlike chimpanzees and orangutans, none of the gorillas showed 199 
spontaneous mirror-guided self-exploration. Despite an additional six days of 200 
exposure to the mirror, during the mark test the gorillas showed avid interest in the 201 
control mark on their wrist, but none of them investigated the mark on their brow that 202 
could only be seen in the mirror.  203 
Another failure to find evidence of self-recognition in zoo-housed gorillas was 204 
reported by Ledbetter and Basen (1982), who gave each of a 10-year-old adult male 205 
and an 11-year-old female almost 400 hours of mirror exposure. The male in 206 
particular showed social responses - notably aggression - toward his reflection. 207 
Although both individuals habituated to the mirror, no signs of self-recognition were 208 
observed either in the form of spontaneous mirror-guided self-exploration or during a 209 
formal mark test. Another two laboratory-housed gorillas showed very few social 210 
responses toward their reflection and no mark-directed touching in a mark test 211 
(Swartz & Evans, 1994).   212 
In an attempt to facilitate the emergence of self-recognition in two adult zoo-213 
housed gorillas, Shillito et al. (1999) presented each ape with an angled-mirror 214 
apparatus inspired by Anderson and Roeder (1989) that prevented them from making 215 
direct eye contact with the reflection. It had been suggested that due to gorillas’ 216 
natural aversion to direct gaze, insufficient exploration of the reflected face could 217 
account for their failure to learn that they themselves were the source of the reflection. 218 
However, the gorillas never showed mirror-guided self-exploration during the angled 219 
mirror exposure period (approximately 45 min per day for 33 days), nor did they 220 
touch the mark on their head during a mark test. In contrast, both gorillas showed 221 
extensive interest in marks on their wrists, indicating that their failure to investigate 222 
the mark on their head in was not due to a general lack of interest in such marks. 223 
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Replacing angled mirrors with a flat mirror and eliminating possible interference due 224 
to the presence of human observers by conducting observations via video cameras 225 
made no difference: neither gorilla showed convincing signs of self-recognition.  226 
Do the above studies show that, despite belonging to the primate family that is 227 
genetically closest to humans, gorillas are incapable of recognizing themselves in a 228 
mirror? There are claims for self-recognition in some individual gorillas. The 229 
American Sign Language-trained gorilla Koko was reported to groom her face, pick at 230 
her teeth and adorn herself in front of mirrors from the age of 3.5 years. When mark-231 
tested at 19 years of age, Koko almost never touched a target area of her head during 232 
sham-mark sessions, but did so almost 50 times when she was marked and could see 233 
herself in the mirror (Patterson and Cohn 1994). Those authors also described a 22-234 
year-old zoo-housed male gorilla showing mirror-guided self-directed responses 235 
especially when his caretaker held the mirror, and Swartz and Evans (1994) claim that 236 
he responded positively on a mark test. Members of a zoo-housed group of gorillas 237 
were described as showing mirror-guided self-directed behaviors, and two individuals 238 
with marks on their face wiped the mark when looking in the mirror; (Parker, 1994) 239 
concluded that there were striking similarities in the responses of gorillas and 240 
chimpanzees to their reflections. A more strictly controlled marking procedure 241 
conducted on a 17-year-old male zoo-housed gorilla (“Xebo”) revealed significantly 242 
more mark-directed responses in the presence of the mirror than when there was no 243 
mirror present. As this positive outcome was obtained following an instance of 244 
manipulating his face while looking in the mirror, the authors concluded that gorillas 245 
are indeed capable of self-recognition (Posada and Colell 2007).  246 
In another case study using a sham-marking control procedure, a 45-year-old 247 
male gorilla (Otto) showed the highest frequency mark-directed behaviors when the 248 
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mirror was present (Allen and Schwartz 2008), although he showed no mirror-guided 249 
self-explorations. Interestingly, neither Xebo nor Otto directed social responses 250 
toward their reflection when the mirror was first introduced. Another adult male 251 
gorilla (“Mopie”), who had failed to show any sign of self-recognition when tested by 252 
Shillito et al. (1999), was given additional exposure to his reflection and then tested 253 
using variants of the mark test (Shumaker and Swartz, 2002). Following training to 254 
peel colored stickers off the walls of his enclosure or his own body in exchange for a 255 
food reward, Mopie discovered a sticker on his head after looking in the mirror; he 256 
removed this sticker and exchanged it for food. When stickers were replaced by a 257 
beam from a laser pointer, Mopie soon learned to touch laser spots to receive rewards, 258 
and he touched one spot that appeared below his chin and that was visible only in the 259 
mirror; however, he did not respond to a laser spot on his head.  260 
Training was also used in a study of a 26-year-old female gorilla who learned 261 
how to use a mirror to solve a discrimination task. She then reportedly passed a 262 
version of the mark test, though few details were given (Nicholson and Gould 1995). 263 
Finally, in a study consisting of a single mirror presentation to members of 12 264 
nonhuman primate species, mirror-guided self-directed responses were reported in all 265 
four great apes species (chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas and orangutans) (Inoue-266 
Nakamura, 1997), but the report is short on details and no mark tests were conducted. 267 
In summary, although the evidence for self-recognition is mixed and less compelling 268 
for gorillas than for other great apes, the basic underlying capacity may be present in 269 
some individuals. It is possible that gorillas may be more susceptible to experiential 270 
and/or personality constraints on the spontaneous and unambiguous expression of 271 
self-recognition. Interestingly, in a cross-cultural study of toddlers living in four 272 
different sociocultural contexts, Kärtner et al. (2012) found that cross-cultural 273 
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differences in children’s self-recognition behaviors was largely related to caretakers’ 274 
emphasis on individuality and autonomy of the child. Although some researchers 275 
have assessed the role of maternal style in great apes on the behavioral development 276 
of offspring (e.g., Hemelrijk and de Kogel 1989; De Lathouwers M, Van Elsacker L 277 
2004), potential effects on self-recognition have not yet been addressed.  Povinelli 278 
(1994) suggested that unusual interventions such as enculturation and sign-language 279 
training might facilitate the emergence of otherwise dormant cognitive structures 280 
supporting the capacity for self-recognition in gorillas. It has also been argued that the 281 
capacity for self-recognition in gorillas may be in the process of being lost due to 282 
evolutionary changes in gorilla socioecology that that no longer put a premium on 283 
mental state attribution in the context of competition for reproductive opportunities 284 
(Gallup, 1997). In concluding the review of the literature on gorillas, we note that in 285 
contrast to the situation for chimpanzees and orangutans, there is a marked lack of 286 
video evidence showing compelling self-recognition in gorillas. In view of its 287 
importance we urge those in possession of such material to make it publically 288 
available.    289 
 290 
The search for self-recognition in other primates 291 
Gallup (1970) assessed mirror-image reactions not only in chimpanzees but also in 292 
members of two Old World monkey species, rhesus and stumptailed macaques. Upon 293 
initial exposure to their reflection the monkeys behaved much like the chimpanzees, 294 
showing strong but diminishing interest across days and initially frequent but 295 
declining social responses. Unlike chimpanzees, however, the monkeys never used 296 
the mirror to inspect normally unseen parts of their body, and none tried to touch the 297 
mark on their head when they saw their reflection during the mark test. These striking 298 
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ape-monkey differences in mirror-guided self-directed behavior led other researchers 299 
to begin searching for self-recognition in non-great ape primates. Multiple 300 
interventions and manipulations have been tried in attempts to obtain evidence that 301 
monkeys are capable of realizing that their behavior is the source of the behavior 302 
depicted in the mirror. In a previous review of “challenges” in self-recognition 303 
research on primates we summarized the various interventions and manipulations 304 
used in the first three decades of the field (Anderson & Gallup 1999). Procedures 305 
have included starting exposure to mirrors at a very early age (from birth or shortly 306 
thereafter), prolonging exposure to months or even years, allowing monkeys physical 307 
access instead of just visual access to mirrors, providing portable mirrors, using 308 
multiple fixed and/or angled mirrors, and allowing monkeys to see not only their own 309 
reflections but also those of other members of their group. Various combinations of 310 
these procedures have been used with bushbabies, lemurs, marmosets and tamarins, 311 
squirrel monkeys, capuchin monkeys, talapoin monkeys, baboons and several species 312 
of macaques, but none has resulted in any prosimian or monkey showing compelling 313 
and reproducible evidence that it recognized its own reflection. 314 
 315 
Gibbons and siamangs 316 
Primates of the family Hylobatidae (gibbons and siamangs) are estimated to have 317 
diverged from the great ape lineage 16-18 million years ago, and from macaques 29 318 
million years ago (Carbone et al. 2014). From a cognitive evolutionary perspective 319 
these so-called lesser apes are often seen as a crucial intermediate case between Old 320 
World monkeys and great apes. Lethmate and Dűcker (1973) reported only social 321 
responses to a mirror, and no self-directed responses in four zoo-housed gibbons 322 
belonging to two species. Inoue-Nakamura (1997) also reported no self-directed 323 
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responses in a pair of white-handed gibbons. In a study of mirror-image reactions in 324 
nine white-handed gibbons and one gibbon-siamang hybrid, Hyatt (1998) found no 325 
mark-directed behaviors during a mark-test, despite four of the gibbons receiving an 326 
additional 400 hours of mirror-image stimulation before the test. Ujhelyi et al. (2000) 327 
exposed three gibbons of three different species to a mirror in intermittent periods for 328 
up to a total of 10 days. Upon initial exposure the three individuals showed a range of 329 
reactions including some social behaviors. However, none of the gibbons responded 330 
to marks on their head in modified mark tests.  331 
 There has been one claim that siamangs show self-recognition (Heschl and 332 
Fuchsbichler, 2009). Following a negative mark test, the behavior of two 7-year-old 333 
siamangs toward a mirror was studied over a 90-day period. The authors reported a 334 
total of seven and five “truly self-referring behaviors in front of the mirror” for the 335 
male and female, respectively (p. 224). However, these behaviors were merely self-336 
referenced behaviors that often occur in the absence of a mirror (e.g., scratching the 337 
head or face); the authors labeled them as “truly self-referring” simply because the 338 
siamangs were looking at the mirror for longer than 3 sec when they were performed. 339 
It is noteworthy that most of the instances consisted of self-scratching, which is 340 
widely accepted to be an indicator of increased tension or anxiety (Maestripieri et al. 341 
1992) and often occurs in non-self-recognizing primates when they see their reflection, 342 
which can be perceived as an oddly behaving conspecific (Anderson, 1994). It is also 343 
unfortunate that the authors did not report similar occurrences of self-scratching of 344 
other body regions while the gibbons stared at the mirror; in any case there was 345 
nothing like the prolonged, careful mirror-mediated inspection of otherwise 346 
nonvisible regions that is typical of chimpanzees’ spontaneous self-exploration.  In 347 
contrast to Heschl and Fuchsbichler’s claim, following an extensive series of 348 
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experiments with three species of hylobatids including siamangs, Suddendorf and 349 
Collier-Baker (2009) reached a quite different conclusion.  Despite elaborate attempts 350 
to create incentives for passing the mark test, including the use of highly preferred 351 
cake icing as marks, all of the subjects failed the mark test, with none showing any 352 
evidence of being able to correctly decipher mirrored information about themselves.  353 
On the basis of these studies we conclude that there is no strong evidence that gibbons 354 
or siamangs are capable of self-recognition. 355 
 356 
Attempts to engineer positive performance on the mark test 357 
Many investigators overlook the fact that some of the strongest evidence for self-358 
recognition in humans and great apes is their use of mirrors to engage in spontaneous, 359 
close inspection of normally unseen body parts. Instead, they focus their efforts into 360 
getting their subjects to perform what looks like a positive mark test response. 361 
Anderson and Gallup (1999) reviewed studies that included more direct 362 
manipulations of monkeys’ experience with their reflections with this objective in 363 
mind. In this category are attempts to explicitly train monkeys to learn the 364 
correspondence between the reflected environment and the real one (for example, 365 
using reflections to find otherwise hidden objects), marking the subject on different 366 
parts of the body over several days, progressing from directly visible body marks to 367 
marks visible only via the mirror, rewarding the subject for touching marks, and 368 
increasing the saliency of the marks used during mark tests. In the remainder of this 369 
review we focus on some of these recent attempts to engineer self-recognition in 370 
monkeys.  371 
One earlier claim for self-recognition in a small South American monkey, the 372 
cotton-top tamarin, deserves comment because it was the first such claim and as such 373 
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it received considerable publicity. Hauser et al. (1995) incorrectly asserted that 374 
previous studies of self-recognition in monkeys had neglected the issue of whether 375 
they would be interested in any marks on their bodies, and conducted mark tests with 376 
tamarins in which the monkeys’ natural crest of white hair on the head was dyed a 377 
different color. A total of 13 mark-directed responses were reported in 5 tamarins thus 378 
marked; however, serious doubts were raised about that study’s conclusions based on 379 
inadequate information about inter-observer reliability, whether the monkeys also 380 
touched their dyed crest when the mirror was absent, and whether they repeatedly 381 
investigated their dyed crest (testing was halted as soon as any mark-directed 382 
response was noted (Anderson and Gallup 1997, 1999). An attempt by the same 383 
laboratory to replicate their finding of self-recognition in cotton-top tamarins resulted 384 
in failure (Hauser et al. 2001), and since then there have been no further claims that 385 
monkeys of the family Callithrichidae are capable of self-recognition. Indeed in one 386 
modification of the mark test, a chocolate-flavored cream was used to increase 387 
marmoset monkeys’ motivation to locate the mark on their head, but no marmosets 388 
used their reflection to investigate the mark; in fact some individuals tried to lick the 389 
chocolate mark in the mirror (Heschl and Burkart 2006). If there is a lesson to be 390 
learned from the case of the cotton top tamarins, it is that studies of visual self-391 
recognition need to be especially careful about procedural aspects such as inter-392 
observer reliability, comparing behaviors in the presence and absence of mirrors, 393 
comparing behaviors while looking at the mirror versus looking elsewhere, and the 394 
validity of the behavioral parameters recorded, including frequency and durations. 395 
In the most recent attempt to engineer self-recognition in monkeys, Chang et 396 
al. (2015) used a training procedure with rhesus monkeys that they claim resulted in 397 
“mirror-induced self-directed behaviors resembling mirror self-recognition” (p. 1). 398 
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Other authors have been quick to conclude from Chang et al.’s report that rhesus 399 
monkeys appear to show the same level of self-awareness as some great apes (Toda 400 
and Platt, 2015). As this study represents the newest challenge to the view that the 401 
capacity for self-recognition in primates may be limited to the great apes and humans, 402 
it requires close scrutiny. 403 
Compared with previous attempts to train mirror self-recognition in monkeys, 404 
the procedures used by Chang et al. (2015) were especially elaborate, long-drawn-out, 405 
and painstaking. Training lasted for up to 38 days with literally thousands of trials, 406 
and initially required that monkeys be chair-restrained and forced to confront their 407 
reflection for extended periods of time. As the monkeys looked at the mirror they 408 
received short bursts of laser beams focused on their faces in an attempt to produce 409 
irritation. Coupled with the application of the laser beams, the monkeys were also 410 
given food rewards for touching the points of irritation on their faces.  As might be 411 
expected from principles of conditioning, this training resulted in the monkeys 412 
eventually learning this simple association and reacting to marks they saw in the 413 
mirror by touching their faces and looking at their fingers – much as they would when 414 
encountering other learned sources of irritation or injury. 415 
It is important to recall that in designing the mark test, Gallup (1970) took 416 
careful and detailed steps to ensure that the chimpanzees would not know they had 417 
been marked and would be unable to detect the marks without a mirror. First, the 418 
chimpanzees were anesthetized and rendered unconscious prior to the application of 419 
the marks so they would have no information about having been marked. Second, the 420 
marks were strategically placed on the top of an eyebrow ridge and the opposite ear in 421 
such a way that the marks could not be seen without a mirror. Finally, the dye was 422 
chosen to be free from any telltale tactile or olfactory cues, so that once the dye had 423 
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dried and the chimpanzees recovered from anesthesia in the absence of a mirror there 424 
would be no way for them to know about the existence of the strange red marks on 425 
their faces. Similar to other authors who have tried to engineer self-recognition in 426 
monkeys (Heschl and Burkart 2006; Roma et al. 2007; Rajala et al. 2010), Chang et al. 427 
(2015) did just the opposite. Their monkeys were given extensive and focused 428 
experience with the marks and underwent prolonged periods of explicit training with 429 
reinforcement to touch these and other marks before being tested for self-recognition. 430 
Our view is that what Chang et al. (2015) accomplished as a consequence is a trained 431 
simulation of self-recognition, rather than self-recognition itself, analogous to 432 
somebody being taught the correct responses to questions on an intelligence test and 433 
thereby receiving a higher score, but without any fundamental change in their 434 
underlying intelligence. As we pointed out in a critique of a previous paper claiming 435 
to demonstrate self-recognition in rhesus monkeys based on a different source of 436 
irritation (Anderson and Gallup, 2011), to be a valid test of self-recognition the mark 437 
must not only be previously unseen and unfelt, it must be unknown (but see Bard et al. 438 
2006 for an alternative view).  439 
It is noteworthy that following their training with lasers and extensive 440 
reinforcement, Chang et al.’s (2015) monkeys failed to distinguish between laser 441 
marks projected to the wall of their cage and to parts of their body that they could see 442 
directly: they similarly touched both, suggesting that they had not learned to 443 
distinguish one from the other and were only doing what they had been trained to do. 444 
Rather than showing the monkeys understood they were seeing themselves in the 445 
mirror, these observations imply that their bodies were simply being treated as 446 
another part of the environment, to be responded to for reward as dictated by their 447 
training history. By contrast, with no coaxing or training whatsoever chimpanzees 448 
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often come to spontaneously use mirrors to investigate and manipulate features of 449 
their body they have not seen before; they make faces at the mirror, inspect the inside 450 
of their mouth, and/or use the reflection to investigate their ano-genital area. It is 451 
notable that none of Chang et al.’s rhesus monkeys showed similar patterns of 452 
spontaneous self-exploration, nor have any other monkeys.  453 
It is interesting to compare the videotaped instances of ostensible mirror-454 
induced self-directed behavior presented by Chang et al. (2015) and readily available 455 
video clips of chimpanzees responding to mirrors. The behaviors are quite different. 456 
Unlike the rich, impromptu series of attempts by chimpanzees to manipulate and 457 
investigate things about themselves discovered in the mirror, the instances described 458 
as self-directed in the rhesus monkeys are simpler and stereotyped, including 459 
“checking their own bodies or pulling their own face or head hair” (p. 215). In 460 
addition, in Chang et al.’s videos the dye marks appear very fresh and are probably 461 
visible even without a mirror and as such may have inadvertently provided the 462 
monkeys with visual and tactile cues that could be used to detect the presence of these 463 
marks in the absence of a mirror; this invalidates these demonstrations and is clearly 464 
at variance with most of the work done with apes.  465 
It would be of interest to follow the behavior of Chang et al.’s (2015) trained 466 
rhesus monkeys over an extended period of time. One question that might be asked is 467 
how they would react toward their reflection after some time with no mirror present. 468 
Studies have shown that in macaques although the tendency to treat the reflection as 469 
another animal eventually habituates, simply removing the mirror for several days or 470 
even moving it from one side of the cage to the other can trigger a dramatic 471 
reinstatement of social responses toward the reflection; this even occurs in rhesus 472 
monkeys reared in front of mirrors all their lives (Gallup and Suarez 1991).  If Chang 473 
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et al.’s monkeys also show a resurgence of social responses, the case for self-474 
recognition would be substantially weakened. As noted earlier, the capacity for 475 
spontaneous self-recognition is stable in chimpanzees even after years with no 476 
intervening exposure to their reflection. 477 
Trying to engineer self-recognition through extensive training is not 478 
fundamentally different from attempts to program robots in the presence of mirrors to 479 
superficially go through some of the same movements involved in self-recognition 480 
(Gold & Scassellati, 2009).  Whatever engineers and computer scientists get robots to 481 
do, they are clearly doing it while circumventing what it is that underpins this evolved, 482 
natural capacity in humans and great apes.  Merely simulating certain features of self-483 
recognition through training/programing does not mean that the underlying 484 
mechanisms are the same, similar, or even remotely related (Gallup et al. 2011). 485 
 486 
Neuropsychological considerations 487 
Another interesting difference in self-awareness between chimpanzees and 488 
monkeys was described by Menzel et al. (1985). Mirror-experienced chimpanzees and 489 
rhesus monkeys were given the task of finding hidden food on the other side of an 490 
opaque barrier by monitoring the reflection of their own hand in a mirror. Unlike the 491 
chimpanzees, who solved the problem with ease, the rhesus monkeys failed.  Indeed, 492 
they vocalized and threatened their hand when they saw it approach the food in the 493 
mirror – as if it were the hand of another monkey. Studies with humans show that 494 
when the right cortical hemisphere is temporarily deactivated with sodium 495 
amobarbital, people often mistake their hand as belonging to someone else (Meador et 496 
al. 2000), reminiscent of rhesus monkeys. Furthermore, humans whose faces were 497 
morphed in a 50/50 ratio with the face of a famous person report seeing the famous 498 
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person’s face when their right hemisphere is anesthetized, but see their own face 499 
when the left hemisphere is anesthetized (Keenan et al. 2001). The same is true for 500 
schizophrenic patients who also cannot distinguish images of their hand from another 501 
person’s hand, and people with premorbid schizophrenic traits who exhibit right 502 
hemisphere deficits for recognizing their faces and deficits for picking self-descriptive 503 
adjectives (Platek et al. 2002; 2003).  Damage to the right hemisphere has also been 504 
implicated in mental state attribution deficits and impaired autobiographical memory 505 
(see Gallup et al. 2003).  Right hemisphere damage likewise leads to deficits in 506 
ownership and agency of body parts (Feinberg & Keenan, 2005).  Data such as these 507 
implicate the existence of self-processing mechanisms in the right side of the human 508 
brain. The extent to which homologous mechanisms exist in the brains of self-509 
recognizing great apes compared to non-self-recognizing monkeys remains to be 510 
clarified.  511 
Two recent comprehensive reviews exemplify the growing interest in the 512 
neuropsychological basis for self-recognition. One consists of a thorough and detailed 513 
account of evidence showing specific neural anatomical features that distinguish 514 
primate species that can recognize themselves in mirrors from those that cannot 515 
(Butler and Suddendorf, 2014). The other involves an ALE meta-analysis of fMRI 516 
studies of self-recognition and theory of mind in humans (van Veluw and Chance, 517 
2014), which identifies specific areas of the brain that are especially active under 518 
conditions of self-face identification.  Consistent with predictions made long ago 519 
based on the hypothesis that self-awareness is what makes mental state attribution 520 
possible (Gallup, 1982), there is mounting evidence for considerable overlap between 521 
brain areas linked to self-recognition and those that have been implicated in the 522 
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capacity to take into account what other people know, want or intend to do; i.e., 523 
theory of mind.   524 
Finally, we could use Menzel’s paradigm to make another testable 525 
prediction.  If Chang et al.’s (2015) trained monkeys have achieved an integrated 526 
sense of self-awareness as a consequence of extensive somatosensory training, then 527 
they ought to be able solve Menzel’s problem with ease or at least much faster than 528 
macaques with no such training (Anderson, 1986; Itakura, 1987).   529 
 530 
Conclusions 531 
In the final analysis, the results of any study must be independently replicated by 532 
other scientists in order for the findings to be considered reliable.  The demonstration 533 
of mirror self-recognition in chimpanzees, orangutans and humans has been replicated 534 
many times by different investigators all over the world (for a review see Gallup et al. 535 
2011).  In contrast, the track record for claims of self-recognition in other species has 536 
not been encouraging.  Single published reports of mirror self-recognition in one 537 
elephant that failed on a re-test (Plotnik et al. 2006), one dolphin (Reiss & Marino 538 
2001), and two magpies (Prior et al. 2008) have yet to be replicated. Indeed, recent 539 
evidence with other corvids suggests that apparent instances of mirror self-recognition 540 
by magpies may be an artifact of tactile cues (Soler et al. 2014).  And in the case of 541 
cotton-top tamarins (Hauser et al. 1995) an attempt to replicate the original positive 542 
results completely failed (Hauser et al. 2001).   543 
In conclusion, it is important to stress that without strong corroborating 544 
evidence, training-induced performances that merely mimic or resemble behavior 545 
spontaneously seen in other species tell us little about the cognitive abilities 546 
underlying such behaviors. While interesting, the results presented by Chang et al. 547 
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(2015) are not compelling evidence that rhesus monkeys are capable of self-548 
recognition. It is important to recall that mirror self-recognition per se was not 549 
selected for in evolutionary history. Instead, mirror self-recognition is an expression 550 
of an underlying sense of self that allows individuals to engage in other cognitive and 551 
emotional acts such as empathy, reconciliation, consolation, and perspective-taking. It 552 
is therefore reasonable to ask, for example, whether monkeys trained to show 553 
behaviors that resemble passing the mark test also then show any of those other signs 554 
of social intelligence that are characteristic of naturally self-recognizing species. If 555 
they do not, it remains unclear what theoretical advances emerge from efforts to train 556 
“mirror-induced self-directed behaviors resembling mirror self-recognition” (p. 1). Of 557 
equal importance is whether claims of finding self-recognition in species hitherto 558 
considered incapable can be replicated by other investigators. 559 
   560 
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Fig. 1 Examples of spontaneous mirror-guided exploration of normally unseen body 767 
parts in chimpanzees (photos by D J Povinelli) 768 
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